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of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection
of individuals with regard to the processing of
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M. Davilla, ‘International E-Discovery: Navigating
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discovery of foreign e-mail in United States
litigation in the future.’ (footnote) n23 Article 29
Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 8/2001 on
the Processing of Personal Data in the Employment
Context, at 24, 5062/01/EN/Final WP 48 (Sept. 13,
2001) (concluding that ‘[t]here should no longer
be any doubt that data protection requirements
apply to the monitoring and surveillance of
workers whether in terms of email use, internet
access, video cameras or location data’). It seems
that Ms. Davilla is confusing the issues. The issue
of whether data protection prohibits e-mail
surveillance is a different issue from whether those
e-mails should be disclosed as ESI.), and David W.
Ogden and Sarah Rapaway, ‘General Commentary,
Discovery in Transnational Litigation’ in John
Fellas, general editor, Transnational Litigation: A
Practitioner’s Guide (Oxford University Press, New
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Some lawyers mistakenly conclude that the
European Union Data Protection Directive1 is a
burden on the transborder discovery of
electronically stored information (ESI). The Data
Protection Directive does not, in fact, place a
burden on the discovery of ESI. It simply
mandates that EU member states enact
legislation in harmony with the Directive. Lawyers
must, instead, focus upon the individual
legislation, policies, and procedures of the EU
member states. Finally, lawyers need to
understand the factors relied upon by United
States courts in applying the United States
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and The Hague
Convention Rules in transborder discovery
requests.2
This short paper has a very narrow focus, and does not
cover the ground in great detail, but aims to provide a
short, high-level introduction to the factors that US
courts will consider when assessing transborder
discovery requests.
An outline of the EU Directive and UK law 
The Data Protection Directive requires that EU member
state legislation exempt transborder data transfers from
data protection laws, as provided in Article 26(1)(d):
(d) the transfer is necessary or legally required on
important public interest grounds, or for the
establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims
In the United Kingdom, Article 26(1)(d) of the Data
Protection Directive is implemented by paragraph 5 of
Schedule 4 of the Data Protection Act 1998:
The transfer—
(a) is necessary for the purpose of, or in connection
with, any legal proceedings (including prospective
legal proceedings),
(b) is necessary for the purpose of obtaining legal
advice, or
(c) is otherwise necessary for the purposes of
establishing, exercising or defending legal rights.
In addition, the Data Protection Act of 1998 exempts
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transborder data transfers, as set out in section 35:
Disclosures required by law or made in connection
with legal proceedings etc
(1) Personal data are exempt from the non-disclosure
provisions where the disclosure is required by or
under any enactment, by any rule of law or by the
order of a court.
(2) Personal data are exempt from the non-disclosure
provisions where the disclosure is necessary—
(a) for the purpose of, or in connection with, any legal
proceedings (including prospective legal
proceedings), or
(b) for the purpose of obtaining legal advice,
or is otherwise necessary for the purposes of
establishing, exercising or defending legal rights.
Personal data is also exempt in the case of legal
professional privilege, as provided for in Schedule 7,
paragraph 10:
Personal data are exempt from the subject
information provisions if the data consist of
information in respect of which a claim to legal
professional privilege or, in Scotland, to
confidentiality as between client and professional
legal adviser, could be maintained in legal
proceedings.
How U.S. courts apply U.S. Federal Rules of
Procedure 
United States courts will apply the Federal Rules of
Procedure rather than Hague Convention Rules where
the court has analyzed the importance of the discovery
requests; weighed the United States’ interest in
enforcement of its own laws; analyzed the effectiveness
of Hague Convention Rules and Procedures, and
weighed these interests against the burden and
intrusiveness of the discovery requests on foreign
defendants.
In the case of In re Vitamins Antitrust Litigation,3 the
United States Federal District Court upheld a Special
Master’s rejection of a claim by German and Swiss
defendants that discovery would violate German and
Swiss privacy laws. The court found disclosure was
warranted, because of a compelling United States
interest in the enforcement of its antitrust statutes. The
court agreed that disclosure of information protected by
the German Federal Data Protection Act would be
warranted if the information is necessary to protect
public interests or the interests of the plaintiffs, or both,
and the data subjects have no legitimate interest in
preventing disclosure. The court acknowledged that by
compelling disclosure, it may implicate ‘legitimate
privacy law concerns’ and possible criminal liability in
Germany. Since the discovery was a small subset of a
larger discovery request, the court allowed the
defendants to file a preliminary privacy log detailing
which information that would be covered by the German
and Swiss privacy laws. The court directed the plaintiffs
to determine whether such information was essential
and whether to amend a protective order to safeguard
the defendants from liability.
Summary of factors relied upon by United
States courts in compelling disclosure 
In the 2008 United States case of Strauss v. Credit
Lyonnais, S.A.,4 the Federal Eastern District Court of New
York considered transnational discovery sought by the
heirs of victims of terrorist attacks from the defendant
French bank Credit Lyonnais, alleging that the bank
provided material support to the terrorists. The
defendants filed a motion for protective orders,
requesting that the court: compel plaintiffs to seek
discovery through the Hague Convention on the Taking
of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters; and
excuse Credit Lyonnais from providing discovery
protected under French bank secrecy laws, a violation of
which would be a criminal offense. The court denied the
motion for protective orders.
Citing Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v.
United States District Court for the Southern District of
Iowa,5 and Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law
of the United States § 442(1)(c), the court in Strauss
considered five primary factors:
1. the importance to the investigation or litigation of
the documents or other information requests;
2. the degree of specificity of the request;
3. whether the information originated in the United
States;
4. the availability of alternative means of securing the
information; and
5. the extent to which noncompliance with the
request would undermine important interests of
the United States, or
6. the extent to which compliance with the request
would undermine the important interests of the
state where the information is located.
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4 242 F.R.D. 199, 68 Fed.R.Serv.3d 72, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 39428 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2008).
5 482 U.S. 522 (1987), 107 S.Ct. 2542, 96 L.Ed.2d 461
(1987).
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The Strauss court also considered ‘the hardship of
compliance on the party or witness from whom
discovery is sought and the good faith of the party
resisting discovery.’6
In the 1987 United States Federal Rules Decision case
of Minpeco, S.A. v. Conticommodity Services, Inc.,7 the
court identified seven factors relevant to a foreign
discovery, and then highlighted four of those as the
principal factors:
1. the competing interests of the nations whose laws
are in conflict,
2. the hardship of compliance on the party or witness
from whom discovery is sought,
3. the importance to the litigation of the information
and documents requested, and
4. the good faith of the party resisting discovery.
Two of those factors - the competing national interests
of each nation, and the importance to the litigation of
the requested discovery - are also identified in the
Restatement.
In addition to the four ‘principal’ factors, the Minpeco
court also identified three additional factors:
1. the extent to which the required conduct is to take
place outside of the United States,
2. the nationality of the entity, and
3. the extent to which enforcement by action of either
state can reasonably be expected to achieve
compliance with the rule prescribed by that state.
A closer look at the factors as applied by the
court in Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais, S.A.
First, the information requested was crucial to the
plaintiffs’ claims that Credit Lyonnais provided financial
services to terrorist organization for more than thirteen
years. Second, the discovery requests were narrowly
tailored – the plaintiffs’ sought documentation and
testimony regarding the relationship between the
defendant and terrorist organization, the nature and
extent of the services that defendant provided, the
collection or distribution of funds by Credit Lyonnais
that may have been used by the terrorist organization or
its associates or both to support terrorism, and any
knowledge that Credit Lyonnais had of their alleged
terrorist connections. Third, the majority of the
requested discovery originated outside the United
States, but Credit Lyonnais could have designated a
witness who resided outside France and who could have
testified after a review of the relevant records. Fourth,
the availability of alternative methods – the plaintiffs did
not have direct or ready access to the records of Credit
Lyonnais through means other than discovery demands.
Credit Lyonnais acknowledged that certain discovery
would not be granted under the Hague Convention.
Fifth, the mutual interests of the United States and
France in combating terrorism favour disclosure and
outweighed the French interest, if any, in protecting the
disputed discovery. The interests of the United States
and France in combating terrorist financing, as
evidenced by the legislative history of the US
Antiterrorism Act, Presidential Executive Orders, and
both countries’ participation in international treaties
and task forces aimed at disrupting terrorist financing,
outweighed the French interest in bank secrecy laws
and its generally-asserted interest in sovereignty.
Despite numerous and ample opportunities to do so,
the French Ministry of Justice never specifically objected
to the plaintiffs’ discovery demands. The United States
also has a substantial interest in fully and fairly
adjudicating matters before its courts. In addition,
Credit Lyonnais was not likely to face substantial
hardship by complying with the plaintiffs’ requests. If
the objecting litigant is a party to the action, as was
Credit Lyonnais, courts accord that party’s hardship less
weight. Credit Lyonnais’ potential hardship was reduced
further, since the parties were bound by previously
issued protective orders that forbade them from publicly
disclosing any sensitive information produced to them.
Finally, Credit Lyonnais only made ‘good faith and
diligent efforts’ to secure discovery after court orders
were issued.
The lessons of Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais,
S.A. 
First, that US courts will broadly support transborder
discovery in terrorism, taxation, and securities or
financial fraud cases, and will broadly construe the
relevance of the requested discovery, rewarding efforts
to tailor clear and not too onerous discovery requests.
In addition, US judges will expect some reasonable and
early efforts at document preservation, review, and
production by foreign discovery custodians. In contrast,
a court will minimize most claims of hardship,
particularly when a requested discovery is digital in
format or physical copies exist in various jurisdictions.
US courts will apply US Federal Rules of Procedure in
6 Reino De Espana v. American Bureau of Shipping,
No. 03 Civ. 3573, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15685, 2005
WL 1813017 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2005), 2005 A.M.C.
2257.
7 116 F.R.D. 517, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), 8 Fed.R.Serv.3d
1121.
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the absence of a clearly superior or expedient
alternative under the Hague Convention. Great weight
will be given to US interests, and judges will strive to
find similar or arguably equivalent foreign interests,
minimizing a generalized invocation of a foreign
country’s sovereignty or data protection laws, although
rewarding specific objections by the foreign country’s
data protection authorities that are directed to specific
items of requested discovery. In addition, US courts will
readily fashion confidentiality orders to minimize claims
that disclosure will violate a foreign county’s privacy or
secrecy laws.
Finally, it is interesting to note that US courts are
starting to invoke a broad and substantial interest in
fully and fairly adjudicating matters before its courts.
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